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ABSTRACT Jürgen +DEHUPDV¶VUHFHQWZRUNLVGHILQHGE\WZRWUHQGVDQHQJDJHPHQW
with the realm of the sacred and a concern for the future of the European Union. 
Despite the apparent lack of connection between these themes, I argue the early 
history of European integration has important implications for his conclusions about 
the place of faith in public life. Although Habermas¶V work on religion suggests that 
the sacred contains important normative resources for postsecular democracies, he 
continues to bar explicitly religious justifications from discourse in state institutions. I 
question this exclusion of the sacred by historically reconstructing the role that 
political Catholicism played in the early history of integration. Focusing on two of the 
most important actors involved in the creation of the first European Community, 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, 
I show how the explicitly religious reasons can broaden political perspectives, 
resulting in the creation of new, inclusive postnational forms of communal life. 
Pushing Habermas to accept the implications of his theological turn, I argue that 
pluralistic, nondogmatic and nonauthoritarian religious claims should be allowed to 
enter into the formal public sphere through a discursively determined interpretation of 
secular translation. 
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Religion and Integration 
As an heir to WKH)UDQNIXUW6FKRRO¶Vpraxis-oriented tradition of critical theory, 
Jürgen Habermas analyzes social pathologies through critical ³GLDJQRVHVRIWKH
present´Zeitdiagnosen). His recent work has thus been defined by two trends. The 
first is what Austin Harrington describes as a ³theological WXUQ´PRWLYDWHG by the 
attacks of 9/11 and the violence that followed in their wake. The second is his concern 
for the ³IDOWHULQJSURMHFW´of European integration, which has been threatened by a 
number of ongoing FKDOOHQJHVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHXQLRQ¶V eastern enlargement into 
postcommunist Europe, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty (2004), the Great 
Recession of 2008 and the divisions emanating from the crisis of the Eurozone.1 
At first glance these themes appear to be driven by different parts of 
+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRUHWLFDOV\VWHP+RZHYHU,FRQWHQGWKDWthe example of European 
LQWHJUDWLRQKDVLPSRUWDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU+DEHUPDV¶VZULWLQJVRQUHOLJLRQ. Although 
religion is often seen as a source of violence, intolerance and disagreement, the 
origins of the European Union (EU) demonstrate that faith can act as a constructive 
political resource when it is articulated in pluralistic, nondogmatic and 
nonauthoritarian terms. I present the Schuman Plan (1951) as a study of how modern 
religious consciousness can act as a cognitive, motivational and justificatory resource 
for postnational politics.2 
Habermas endorses religion in public life insofar as it expands the cognitive and 
motivational capacities of individuals and communities. However, he rejects the 
sacred as a source of public justification. Habermas argues that reasoning based on 
faith should be articulated within state institutions only after it has undergone a 
³VHFXODUWUDQVODWLRQ´LQWR³SRVWPHWDSK\VLFDO´WHUPVLHLQWRODQJXDJHWKDWLV
accessible to believers and non-believers alike.3 
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The early history of European integration violates the restrictions Habermas 
places on the sacred. Two of the most important leaders involved in the foundation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, both drew heavily on the 
³ZRUOG-disclosing power of religious semantics.´ The political Catholicism that 
DQLPDWHG(XURSH¶VSRVWZar Christian Democratic parties helped them not only to 
conceive and motivate this PRYH³EH\RQGWKHQDWLRQ-VWDWH´EXWDOVRWRjustify it using 
explicitly religious vocabulary.4 I argue that the early history of integration presents 
an internal challenge WR+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRU\RIVHFXODUWUDQVODWLRQbecause of his vocal 
support for the projet européen and his desire to integrate theoretical reflection with 
real world events.5 
The implications of my argument go beyond intellectual history. By 
investigating the role of religion in the creation of the first European Community, I 
provide a concrete example of how faith can help create more inclusive forms of 
communal life. In an increasingly globalized world, where migration, trade and 
information technology makes interaction with other cultures and traditions 
inevitable, conceptions of the sacred that encourage dialogue between atheists, 
Christians, Muslims and other believers, will be crucial to forging new forms of 
politics where citizens can live together in more than a modus vivendi.6 
In the first part RIWKHDUJXPHQW,RXWOLQH+DEHUPDV¶VXVHRIUHOLJLRQWRVDOYDJH
³LPSRUWDQWUHVRXUFHVRIPHDQLQJ´IRUD³SRVWVHFXODUZRUOG´,WKHQWXUQWRWKHUROH
that political Catholicism played in pushing postwar European leaders to take the 
historically radical step of giving up sovereignty to institutions outside the 
constitutional architecture of the nation-state. I argue that it is highly unlikely that the 
³UHIOH[LYHDVVLPLODWLRQRIUHOLJLRXVFRQWHQWV´LQWRVHFXODUWHUPVZRXOGKDYHEHHQ
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enough to stimulate this move towards postnational political community on its own.7 I 
then consider the standing of this example IRU+DEHUPDV¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
relationship between politics and religion. In the penultimate section I argue that 
secular translation is a process that should continue within state institutions by 
bridging the public divide between believers and non-believers through a gradual 
process of familiarization. I conclude by reflecting on the need for increased mutual 
understanding in an age of increasing globalization. 
 
Religious Rationality in a Postsecular World 
Since the eighteenth century, philosophy has sought to banish religion from the 
public sphere. Immanuel Kant thus interpreted the Enlightenment as ³WKHJHQXLQHDJH
RIFULWLFLVPWRZKLFKHYHU\WKLQJPXVWVXEPLW´+HDUJXHGWKDWVRFLHW\PXVWOLEHUDWH
itself IURPWKH³WXWHODJH´Unmündigkeit) of religion, respecting ³RQO\WRWKDWZKLFK
KDVEHHQDEOHWRZLWKVWDQGWKHIUHHDQGSXEOLFH[DPLQDWLRQRIUHDVRQ´8 
A century later Karl Marx was even more forceful in his rejection of religion. 
He presented faith DV³WKHRSLXPRIWKHSHRSOH«WKHLOOXVRU\VXQDERXt which man 
UHYROYHVVRORQJDVKHGRHVQRWUHYROYHDERXWKLPVHOI´0DU[VDZUHOLJLRQDVDVRXUFH
of repression used by the ruling class to convince the masses to accept their meager 
fate in this life in exchange for salvation in the next.9 
Whereas Marx pleaded for the active rejection of religion, in the twentieth 
century Max Weber and Émile Durkheim saw the deterioration of faith as an 
epiphenomenon of modernization. Weber argued that the rationalization of society 
into separate spheres would lead to the ³GHP\VWLILFDWLRQ´Entzauberung) of the 
world, while Durkheim linked this differentiation to the division of labor in society. 
Later sociologists combined these arguments into the secularization thesis, which 
links WKH³SURJUHVVLYHVKULQNDJHDQGGHFOLQHRI UHOLJLRQ´to the onset of modernity.10 
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+DEHUPDV¶Vintellectual development mirrors this trajectory. In his early work, 
he engaged with religion through the prism of Marxist ideology critique. In the 1980s, 
however, +DEHUPDV¶V work shifted across two dimensions, departing from critical 
WKHRU\¶VWUDGLWLRQDOVNHSWLFLVPWRZDUGVWKHUHDOPRIWKHVDFUHG.11 In Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981) he (1) took up religious themes explicitly and (2) did so 
in a manner more reminiscent of Durkheim than Marx. In line with his intersubjective 
discourse theory, he restated the secularization WKHVLVLQWHUPVRIWKH³OLQJXLVWLILFDWLRQ
RIWKHVDFUHG´die Versprachlichung des Sakralen). Habermas argued that the process 
of modernization had translated the basic insights of the sacred into a secular 
vocabulary accessible to all.12 
This shift is due at least in part WR+DEHUPDV¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRI the theological 
origins of Enlightenment philosophy. He notes, ³8QLYHUVDOLVWLFHJDOLWDULDQLVPIURP
which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous 
conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights 
and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian 
ethiFRIORYH´+DEHUPDVhas even confessed that ³P\FRQFHSWLRQRIODQJXDJHDQGRI
communicative action oriented toward mutual understanding nourishes itself from the 
OHJDF\RI&KULVWLDQLW\´Although postmetaphysical philosophy might wish to distance 
itself from Judeo-&KULVWLDQWKHRORJ\³8SWRWKLVYHU\GD\WKHUHLVQRDOWHUQDWLYHWR
LW´13 
+DEHUPDV¶VUHFHQWZRUNthus JRHVEH\RQGHYHQ'XUNKHLPLQDGPLWWLQJ³WKH
SRVVLELOLW\RIDFRQWLQXHGµPLJUDWLRQRIWKHRORJLFDOFRQWHQWVLQWRWKHVHFXODU¶´*LYHQ
the growing DZDUHQHVVWKDW³VRPHWKLQJLVPLVVLQJ´LQRXU³DPELYDOHQWPRGHUQDJH´
KHDIILUPVQRWRQO\WKDW³SKLORVRSK\PXVWEHUHDG\WROHDUQIURPWKHRORJ\´EXWDOVR
WKDW³UHOLJLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVKDYHDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOVWDWXVWKDWLVQRWSXUHO\DQG
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VLPSO\LUUDWLRQDO´14 Religion is no longer simply part of the genealogy of reason; it is 
also a source of normative inspiration in the present. 
+DEHUPDV¶V shift parallels the broader failure of the secularization thesis. As 
3HWHU%HUJHUSRLQWVRXW³2XUDJHLVQRWDQDJHRIsecularization. On the contrary, it is 
an age of exuberant religiosity´ Given the continued salience of religion, secular 
Europe has become an RXWOLHU³9LHZHGLQWHUPVRIZRUOGKLVWRU\0D[:HEHU¶V
µ2FFLGHQWDO5DWLRQDOLVP¶QRZDSSHDUVWREHWKHDFWXDOGHYLDWLRQ´15 
In order to capture this transformation, Habermas introduces the term 
³µSRVWVHFXODU¶DVDVRFLRORJLFDOGHVFULSWLRQRIDVKLIWLQFRQVFLRXVQHVVLQODUJHO\
VHFXODUL]HGRUµXQFKXUFKHG¶VRFLHWLHVWKDWE\QRZKDYHFRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKH
continued existence of religious communities, and with the influence of religious 
YRLFHVERWKLQWKHQDWLRQDOSXEOLFVSKHUHDQGRQWKHJOREDOSROLWLFDOVWDJH´,QWKH
VSLULWRIFULWLFDOWKHRU\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWREULGJLQJWKHGLYLGHEHWZHHQWKHRUHWLFDO
reflection and empirical research, this descriptive statement also contains a normative 
claim. While society can no longer count on the disappearance of religion, Habermas 
argues that society can benefit from the presence of believers, who can ³salvage´ 
(bergen) valuable resources from their faith traditions.16 
This inclusive desire to allow religious perspectives into the public sphere 
conflicts with his Kantian commitment to reason ³WRZKLFKHYHU\WKLQJPXVWVXEPLW´
Habermas UHVROYHVWKLVSUREOHPE\WXUQLQJWR-RKQ5DZOV¶VFRQFHSWRISXEOLFUHDVRQ
In Political Liberalism (1993) Rawls argued that while believers could participate 
IUHHO\LQFLYLOVRFLHW\WKH\KDGWRVWDWHWKHLUDUJXPHQWVLQWHUPVRIDVHFXODU³SXEOLF
politicaOFXOWXUH´DQ\WLPHWKH\ZHUHDFWLQJDVMXGJHVOHJLVODWRUVSXEOLFRIILFLDOVRU
candidates for public office.17 Rawls later softened his position, utilizing what he 
called D³VHFXODUWUDQVODWLRQSURYLVR´He DUJXHGWKDWUHOLJLRXVLGHDV³PD\EH
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introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course 
SURSHUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQV«DUHSUHVHQWHG´18 
+DEHUPDVDFFHSWV5DZOV¶VEDVLFLQWXLWLRQ+RZHYHUKHDUJXHVWKDWHYHQ
5DZOV¶V relaxed proviso places unequal burdens on the faithful, who have to treat 
their beliefs as placeholders for secular reasons. To rectify this imbalance Habermas 
turns secular translation into an institutional proviso. First, he differentiates between 
the formal and the informal public spheres. Habermas endorses the need for secular 
WUDQVODWLRQLQ³DUUDQJHGSXEOLFV´ZKLFKKHGHILQHVDVLQFOXGLQJ³SDUOLDPHQWVFRXUWV
PLQLVWULHVDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQV´:KHUHDV³SROLWLFLDQVDQGRIILFLDOVZLWKLQSROLWLFDO
LQVWLWXWLRQV´PXVWXVH³ODQJXDJHWKDWLVHTXDOO\DFFHVVLEOHWRDOOFLWL]HQV´+DEHUPDV
DUJXHVWKDWFLWL]HQVLQWKH³ZHDNSXEOLFV´RIFLYLOVRFLHW\VKRXOGEHDOORZHGWRH[SUHVV
their ideas in explicitly religious terms.19 
Second, he seeks to ensure that public deliberations do not place an 
³XQUHDVRQDEOHPHQWDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDO EXUGHQ>RQ@UHOLJLRXVFLWL]HQV´20 Under 
5DZOV¶VSURYLVRWKHRQXVWRSUHVHQW³SURSHUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQV´IDOOVSXUHO\RQWKH
shoulders of believers. However, just as philosophers must remain open to the 
normative potential contained in the sacred, Habermas FRQWHQGVWKDW³WKHUHOLJLRXVO\
XQPXVLFDO´:HEHUPXVWNHHSDQRSHQPLQGUHJDUGLQJWKHUHDVRQVSURYLGHGE\
citizen-believers. He concludes that secular citizen-atheists are obliged to assist 
believers in the process of translation. 
The success of Habermas¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI5DZOV¶VSURYLVRLQHTXDOL]LQJ
the asymmetry between religious and non-religious citizens is open to debate.21 
However, by calling on all citizens to participate in secular translation, Habermas 
does secure more space for citizen-believers. Although he argues that public reason 
PXVWPDLQWDLQLWV³PHWKRGRORJLFDODWKHLVP´RQWKHOHYHORIWKHIRUPDOMXVWLILFDWLRQ
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Habermas allows religion to influence the process of opinion-formation in civil 
society.22 
In addition to acting as a reservoir of new ideas, religion is also an important 
motivational resource. Inspiring adherence to the dictates of reason has been a 
problem ever since G.W.F. +HJHOFULWLFL]HG.DQWIRU³WXUQLQJWKHIRUPRIULJKW´LQWRD
³cold, dead letter´23 Although Habermas aGPLWVWKDW³.DQWKDGUDWKHUWRRPXFK
FRQILGHQFHLQWKHPRWLYDWLRQDOIRUFHRIJRRGUHDVRQV´KHUHMHFWV+HJHO¶VFULWLTXH
Instead, Habermas proposes a division of labor between philosophy, whose task it is 
WRH[SOLFDWHWKHPRUDOSRLQWRIYLHZDQG³SUH-poliWLFDO´FXOWXUDOWUDGLWLRQVLQFOXGLQJ
UHOLJLRQWKDW³anchor WKHPRUDOSRLQWRIYLHZLQWKHKHDUWVRIDFWLQJVXEMHFWV´24 
Nicholas Wolterstorff points out that religion is an important source of 
motivation precisely EHFDXVH³LWEHORQJVWRWKHUHOLJLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVRIDJRRGPDQ\
religious people in our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning 
fundamental issues of justice on WKHLUUHOLJLRXVFRQYLFWLRQV´25 Excluding these 
convictions from public life not only runs the risk that the cognitive resources hidden 
within religious rationality will be lost, but also that its motivating power will 
dissipate as believers are alienated from the public sphere. Whereas secular morality 
is highly individualized and ³QRWLQKHUHQWO\HPEHGGHGLQFRPPXQDOSUDFWLFHV´
UHOLJLRXVFRQVFLRXVQHVVZKLFK³SUHVHUYHVDQHVVHQWLDOFRQQHFWLRQWRWKHRQJRLQJ
SUDFWLFHRIOLIHZLWKLQDFRPPXQLW\´LVDQLPSRUWDQWVRXUFHRIVRFLDOFRKHVLRQ26 
If maintaining fellow-feeling is a problem for existing national communities, it 
is an even greater issue when trying to go push politics beyond the state, as the 
European movement has done. The major world religions ± especially those 
institutionalized in supranational structures, like the Roman Catholic Church ± link 
FLWL]HQVDFURVVVWDWHDQGQDWLRQDOERXQGDULHVWKURXJK³WKHREVHUYDQFHVRIXQLWHG
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JOREDOFRPPXQLWLHVRIDOORIWKHIDLWKIXO´)DFHGZLWKWKHDWRPL]LQJWHQGHQFLHVRI
secularization, Habermas believes that religion might be able to help disseminate 
universalistic forms of transnational solidarity, i.e the ability to see individuals living 
in other states as members of the same community.27 
In the next section, I argue that Catholic social thought played an important role 
in the early history of European integration. As a matter that is ³close to +DEHUPDV¶V 
heart,´ European integration represents an interesting case study of what faith has to 
offer the postnational constellation.28 A closer examination of the origins of the 
European Union (EU) FRQILUPV+DEHUPDV¶VEHOLHILQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIIDLWKDVD
source of normativity and transnational solidarity. However, I argue that religion must 
surpass the cognitive and motivational boundaries Habermas sets for it if it is to serve 
this purpose. 
 
Christian Democracy and European Integration  
My examination of the creation of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
focuses on French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer. My argument about the role that religion ± in the form of Christian 
democracy ± played in the origins of European integration is not meant to downplay 
the importance of economic, geopolitical, military and strategic factors.29 However, I 
want to GUDZDWWHQWLRQWR³WKHIXQGDPHQWDOUROHRI&KULVWLDQ'HPRFUDF\LQ all phases 
RILQWHJUDWLRQ´:ROIUDP.DLVHUFRQFOXGHVWKDWthis movement was indispensible for 
³FUHDWLQJSROLWLFDOWUXVWGHOLEHUDWLQJSROLF\«PDUJLQDOLVLQJLQWHUQDOGLVVHQWZLWKLQWKH
national parties, socialising new members into an existing policy consensus, 
coordinating governmental policy-making and facilitating parliamentary ratification 
RILQWHJUDWLRQWUHDWLHV´30 
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Although Schuman and Adenauer were both affiliated with nondenominational 
parties, as Roman Catholics they were able to draw on a rich tradition that had 
³HYROYHGIURP&DWKROLF confessional parties created in the second part of the 
QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\DQGWKHILUVWSDUWRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\´I argue that this 
movement, which Stathis Kalyvas and Kees van KerVEHUJHQUHIHUWRDV³&KULVWLDQ
democracy (or political Catholicism),´SOD\HGDNH\UROHLQ6FKXPDQDQG$GHQDXHU¶V
cognitive acceptance of supranationalism and in their motivation to pursue a 
(XURSHDQVROXWLRQWRWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VSUREOHPV31 However, in violation of the 
normative barriers in +DEHUPDV¶V theory of the legitimate use of religion, I show that 
these two leaders drew on directly and publically on faith-based justifications for 
integration. 
:KHQ³WKH6L[´± Italy, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the 
Netherlands ± created the ECSC, their governments all contained powerful Christian 
Democratic parties. Drawing on the social and political teachings of the Catholic 
Church, the leaders of this movement believed that the ³QDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\LVMXVW
one among others²locality, workplace, religion² and not fundamentally different 
IURPDVXSUDQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´32 This fractal view of society as a set of Russian 
Matryoshka dolls, with each exponent exhibiting the same characteristics on a 
different scale, helped to lay the cognitive foundations for supranational integration.33 
On a motivational level, many leaders were committed to the ECSC not only 
due to their experience of war and the perceived economic benefits of integration, but 
also because continental unity had become a priority for the Roman Catholic 
Church.34 $IWHUWKHZDU3RSH3LXV;,,HPSKDVL]HGWKDW³DQHVVHQWLDOSRLQWLQDQ\
future international arrangement would be the formation of an organ for the 
maintenance of peace, of an organ invested by common consent with supreme power 
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to whose office it would also pertain to smother in its germinal state any threat of 
LVRODWHGRUFROOHFWLYHDJJUHVVLRQ´35 Building on programs designed by Catholic 
intellectuals, he connected this remedy to the idea of continental integration through 
institutions with direct decision-making power. 
In 1948 Pius XII presented his vision to the Convention of the Union of 
EuropeaQ)HGHUDOLVWVLQ5RPH+HXUJHGWKHOHDGHUVRIWKH³great European nations of 
the continent, with their long histories filled with PHPRULHVRIJORU\DQGSRZHU«WR
disregard [faire abstraction] their past greatness in order to fall into line with a higher 
SROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFDOXQLW\´7KHSRSHDOVRH[SUHVVHGKLVKRSHIRUDQHZHUDLQ
which the ties between religion and European civilization would be reestablished. He 
declared 1950 to be a Holy Year dedicated to peace, which he believed could be 
achieved through integration.36 
Robert 6FKXPDQVDZWKH3RSH¶VVXSSRUWDVDVLJQWKDW³WKHSURYLGHQWLDOPRPHQW
KDGDUULYHG´37 This conclusion rested on his wartime experiences. After serving as 
Under-Secretary of State for Refugees before the German invasion of France, 
Schuman spent the first years of the war as a Nazi prisoner. He devoted his time in 
captivity to reading and reflecting on the social and political teachings of the Catholic 
Church. He realized, ³7KHUHLVRQO\RQHVDOYDWLRQ>Rettung] for Europe ± that is the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVRI(XURSH´38 His use of the language of salvation and reconciliation 
points to the influence of Catholicism on his politics. 
Schuman was convinced that any attempt at European integration would have to 
be based on shared economic interests that went beyond trade liberalization. In 1947 
he FRPPHQWHGRQWKHQHHGWR³SODF>H@DWWKHVHUYLFHRIWKHQDWLRQVDWHDPRIOHDGHUV
apostles of reconciliation and artisans of a new world, which will, after fifteen war-
UDYDJHG\HDUVEHJLQDYDVWVRFLDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ´6FKXPDQ¶VVWDWXVDVDQ
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³H[HPSODU\&KULVWLDQ´DQGWKH³KROLQHVVRIKLVSROLWLFV´has even led to an initiative 
to canonize him as the first saint to be recognized for his political vocation since 
Thomas More.39 
6FKXPDQ¶V support for the plan to create a coal and steel community that 
ultimately bore his name was crucial for many reasons, including his role in securing 
the approval of the French cabinet. It was also important in recruiting the second 
major actor, Konrad Adenauer.40 Like Schuman, the German chancellor had spent 
long parts of the war in internal exile, hiding from the Gestapo in Catholic 
monasteries. This gave him the opportunity to reflect upon Rerum novarum (1891) 
and Quadragesimo anno (1931), the Papal Encyclicals that defined Catholic social 
teaching. 
This experience reinforceGWKHUHOLJLRXVGLPHQVLRQVRI$GHQDXHU¶VSROLWLFV
OHDGLQJKLPWRIRUPXODWHKLV³WZR*HUPDQLHVWKHVLV´:LWKWKLVLGHD Adenauer 
connected the underlying conditions that had brought about National Socialism to the 
Protestant east of Germany dominated by Prussia. By contrast, the second Germany 
VWUHVVHGWKHFRXQWU\¶V&DWKROLFLVPDQGLWV³WUDGLWLRQDOFRQQHFWLRQV«WRLWVZHVWHUQ
QHLJKERUV´GDWLQJEDFNWRWKH+RO\5RPDQ(PSLUH41 
The two Germanies thesis incorporated a historical narrative of the West as 
unified Catholic Abendland ³HYHQLQJ´RU³ZHVWHUQ´FRXQWU\7KHAbendland gave 
Adenauer powerful cognitive resources to think about the future that were not 
associated with the nationalism that had led Germany into two World Wars. His goal 
ZDVWRUHEXLOG*HUPDQ\E\KHOSLQJWR³EULQJWKHROGWUDGLWions back to life and to 
breathe QHZOLIHWRWKHVSLULWXDOOLIHRIRXUKRPHODQG´42 The connection of western 
*HUPDQ\WRWKH5RPDQDQG&DUROLQJLDQSDVWIXUWKHUGLVWDQFHG$GHQDXHU¶VWKLQNLQJ
IURPQDWLRQDOLVP+HUHSHDWHGO\HPSKDVL]HG³WKHFKDQJHIRUWKHEHWWHUEURXJKWDERXW
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by the entry of Christianity into the imaginative and intellectual world of the 
Abendland´43 
The past was also crucial in $GHQDXHU¶VPRWLYDWLRQDOSULRULWL]DWLRQRI
Westbindung ³ELQGLQJWRWKHZHVW´DVWKHprimary goal of his chancellorship. Just 
months after the war, Adenauer had resigned himself to the fact that eastern Germany 
KDGEHHQ´ORVWIRUDWLPHWKDWFDQQRWEHHVWLPDWHG´44 He placed a higher value on 
ZKDWKHGHVFULEHGDVWKH³FXOWXUDOand foreign policy unification with western 
Europe´ than on the unity of the German nation.45 
While it is clear that the framework of political Catholicism played an important 
cognitive and motivational role for both these leaders, they also drew heavily on 
religious language in their political rhetoric. Schuman repeatedly stressed the 
importance of the shared spiritual heritage of Europe. He looked back to the history of 
unified Christendom as a model for supranationalism. Explaining his decision to 
abandon the statist tradition of French diplomacy in favor of supranational 
unification, Schuman noted, ³)RUWKHILUVWWLPHLQDWKRXVDQG\HDUVZH[have been] 
JLYHQWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHEXLOG(XURSHVSLULWXDOO\DQGPDWHULDOO\´46 
In particular, he KRSHGWKDW³WKHIROOLHVRIWKHSDVW´ZRXOGQRWREVFXUH³ZKDW
Christian Europe had in common.´In his speeches he argued that supranationalism 
ZDVDUHWXUQWRWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VSUHQDWLRQDOSDVW 
The realities of our Western Civilization have revived and overcome 
the passions which had temporarily succeeded in obscuring our 
common patrimony. The Europe that we have founded will be 
WKXV«>D@UHWXUQWRSHUHQQLDOWUDGLWLRQZKLFKDPRPHQWDU\DEHUUDWLRQ
had succeeded in making us forget.47 
 
Steeped in Church history6FKXPDQ¶VDWWHPSWWRUHLQYLJRUDWHWRWKHLQWHOOHFWXDO
traditions of the past recalls an age when theological arguments were broadly 
accepted in the public sphere. 
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Adenauer also drew on religious themes in his electoral campaigns and in his 
arguments for integration in the German parliament. He spoke of integration as 
HQFRPSDVVLQJ³WKHHQWLUH&KUistian Abendland´He saw the unification of western 
(XURSHDVDEXOZDUNDJDLQVW³JRGOHVVFRPPXQLVP.´7KHLPDJHRI&KULVWLDQ(XURSH
standing up to the geopolitical threats emanating from the communist bloc played an 
LPSRUWDQWUROHLQDOORI$GHQDXHU¶Velectoral campaigns as the leader of the German 
Christian democrats, as well as in his public support for the Schuman Plan and 
integration more generally.48 
'HVSLWH³WKHRGRURILQFHQVHWKDWFOXQJWRWKHPRYHPHQW´WKHWUDQVQDWLRQDO
solidarity revealed in the origins of European integration also shows that religious 
justifications can be constructive resources for postnational politics.49 Without the 
vocal, public support of Schuman and Adenauer the ECSC may never have come into 
existence; it most certainly would not have taken the shape that it did. A supranational 
Europe organized around shared, community institutions was not the only possible 
form of intra-European cooperation after World War II, nor was it the most likely. 
Both the traditional model of a dismembered Germany and the confederal model 
based on intergovernmental organizations had broad support. Europe only took the 
VXSUDQDWLRQDOSDWKRQO\EHFDXVHNH\OHDGHUV³XVHGDVHULHVRIfait accomplis to resolve 
a wider battle over alternatives to Europe.´50 
It is unlikely that the ECSC could have been founded on supranational 
principles without the support of both Schuman and Adenauer, who fought to push it 
through the governmental apparatus of France and Germany respectively.51 It is also 
unlikely that they would have been so committed to this project without the cognitive, 
motivational and justificatory resources of the political Catholicism that animated 
their personal religious faith and the Christian democratic movement. The direct 
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connection Schuman and Adenauer drew between faith and European political 
integration shows that religion can be an important political resource for the 
postnational constellation. 
 
7KH0HDQLQJRIWKH(8¶V2ULJLQVIRU+DEHUPDV 
To the extent that religious cognitive and motivations resources prompted the 
extension of solidarity across borders in the informal public sphere, Habermas can 
accept this as DQH[DPSOHRIKRZ³µWKHSROLWLFDO¶KDVQRWFRPSOHWHO\ORVWLWV
DVVRFLDWLRQZLWKUHOLJLRQ´+RZHYHUP\UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHIRXQGation of the 
ECSC also shows that religion played an important justificatory role in the formal 
public sphere. Both Schuman and Adenauer made explicitly religious claims in public 
institutions as representatives of their respective states. From this perspective the 
SURMHFWZDVIRXQGHGRQDYLRODWLRQRI+DEHUPDV¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDODFFRXQWRIVHFXODU
WUDQVODWLRQZKLFK³REOLJHVSROLWLFLDQVDQGRIILFLDOVZLWKLQSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWR
IRUPXODWHDQGMXVWLI\«PHDVXUHVH[FOXVLYHO\LQDODQJXDJHWKDWLVHTXDOO\DFFHssible 
WRDOOFLWL]HQV´52 
,DUJXHWKDWWKLVFDVHVWXG\KDVLPSRUWDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU+DEHUPDV¶VDUJXPHQW
on the place of religion in the public sphere. Most theorists could sidestep my critique 
by noting that this historical example has no bearing on their normative reflections. 
However, this defense is more difficult for Habermas given his connection to the 
)UDQNIXUW6FKRROZKLFK³XQGHUVWDQG>V@LWVHOIDVDWKHRUHWLFDOUHIOHFWLRQRIWKe 
HPDQFLSDWRU\PRPHQWVRIWKHDJH´53 
Habermas has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to this principle in his 
political writings (kleine politische Schriften), where he seeks to meet historical 
GHYHORSPHQWV³KDOIZD\.´54 Insofar as Habermas shares in criWLFDOWKHRU\¶V³GLDOHFWLF
RILPPDQHQFHDQGWUDQVFHQGHQFH´KHFDQQRWVLPSO\EUXVKRIIWKLVKLVWRULFDO
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HYLGHQFH*LYHQ+DEHUPDV¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDOFRPPLWPHQWWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRFLDO
PRYHPHQWVDVDIIHFWLQJ³WZRZRUOGV´LHERWKLQVRFLDOUHDOLW\DQGLQWKHQormative 
dimension of philosophical critique, he has to take the social movements into 
account.55 
7KH)UDQNIXUW6FKRRO¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDOHQJDJHPHQWZLWKKLVWRULFDO
developments and its traditional desire to integrate empirical research does not, 
however, mean WKDWKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQWVFDQVLPSO\³GLVSURYH´SKLORVRSKLFDO
conclusions. Seyla Benhabib points out that within critical theory, historical examples 
GRQRWKDYHWKHVWDWXV³RIZKDWHPSLULFDOSROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVWVZRXOGQDPHDµFDVH
study.¶´2QWKHFRQtrary, ³they are offered to show how the very abstract 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIQRUPDWLYHSROLWLFDOWKRXJKW«VKDSHWKHDFWLRQVDQGPRYHPHQWVRI
SROLWLFDODJHQWV´56 
This does not imply that Habermas must simply accept the theoretical 
implications of my historical argument. For example, he could claim that the religious 
claims made by Schuman and Adenauer have undergone secular translation since the 
1950s. Such a response would obviate my critique by setting the European project on 
normatively justified postmetaphysical grounds in the present. This defense would be 
LQOLQHZLWK+DEHUPDV¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWLWLVSRVVLEOHIRUVRFLDODFWRUVWROHJLWLPL]H
SDVWDFWLRQVE\³>G@LVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQWKHOHJDF\ZHDSSURSULDWHDQGWKHRQHZH
ZDQWWRUHIXVH´57 Contemporary Europeans could thus appropriate integration in the 
present while rejecting its religious origins. 
This may be precisely what Habermas believes. In considering the features of a 
common European political identity ± ZKLFKGHILQHV³KRZ(XURSHDWODUJHSUHVHQWV
itself to non-(XURSHDQV´± Habermas lists secularism alongside the continental faith in 
government, a preference for the welfare state, a suspicion of markets, an aversion to 
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the use of force and a desire for multilateral diplomacy. He could therefore argue that 
the claims to Christian solidarity made by Schuman and Adenauer have since been 
WUDQVODWHGLQWRWKHVHFXODUWHUPVRI³WKH(QOLJKWHQPHQWSURMHFWRIGHPRFUDF\UXOHRI
law, respect for the differences of others, and the principles of rational discourse and 
VFLHQFH´58 
Such a response is cogent. Unfortunately, it also undermines the motivations 
behind +DEHUPDV¶VWKHRORJLFDOWXUQ7KHZKROHSRLQWRIVHFXODUWUDQVODWLRQLVWR
HQVXUHWKDWWKHQRUPDWLYHSRWHQWLDORIUHOLJLRQLVQRWORVWWR³DNLQGRIHYDFXDWLQg 
GHSOHWLQJVHFXODUL]DWLRQ´59 7KHUHLVOLWWOHSRLQWLQDOORZLQJFRPPXQLWLHVWR³HPSRZHU
themselves by creating new subjectivities in the public sphere, new vocabularies of 
FODLPPDNLQJDQGQHZIRUPVRIWRJHWKHUQHVV´WKURXJKWKHXVHRIUHOLJLRXVVHmantics 
only to prohibit them from acting on these insights. Since there is no epistemic 
guarantee that a secular translation of religious language exists ± or is available at the 
moment necessary for political action ± this seems to obviate the benefits Habermas 
endorses.60 
*LYHQ+DEHUPDV¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRHQJDJLQJZLWKKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQWVKH
KDVWRFRQIURQWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH(8¶VUHOLJLRXVRULJLQV,argue that he can do so 
by expanding the purview of the sacred within political life. Pushing Habermas to 
accept what I see as the implications of his theological turn, I contend that Habermas 
should allow pluralistic, nondogmatic and nonauthoritarian religious claims into the 
formal public sphere as part of the process of secular translation. 
 
Religion and the Formal Public Sphere 
Even acknowledging the implications of this historical example, Habermas can 
still present a number of objections to further opening his institutional account of 
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secular translation. To start, allowing faith into the political process is potentially 
dangerous, as non-believers might experience religious justifications as ³imposing 
views of what is true and what is right and presenting these as unquestionabl\YDOLG´
However, it is unclear if this threat is intrinsic to religious arguments, or only to 
certain uses of the sacred. Maeve Cooke defends the latter position. She argues that 
public uses of religion are problematic only if: 1) they deny the fact of pluralism in 
modern society; 2) they are dogmatic, shutting down the discursive process of reason-
giving that underlines democratic practice, and; 3) they are authoritarian, rejecting the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement.61 
+DEHUPDV¶Vinstitutional appropriation of the Rawlsian paradigm of public 
reason is designed to defend the rights of secular citizens from theocratic oppression 
by believers. However, his political theory already guards against nonpluralistic, 
dogmatic and authoritarian uses of religion by other means. Before being eligible for 
participation in the informal public sphere and submitting their claims to institutional 
WUDQVODWLRQ+DEHUPDVDUJXHVWKDWEHOLHYHUVPXVWILUVWGLVSOD\ZKDWKHFDOOVD³PRGHUQ
UHOLJLRXVFRQVFLRXVQHVV´6XFKDQunderstanding of faith must meet three 
preconditions: 
first, come to terms with the cognitive dissonance of encountering other 
denominations and religions. It must, second, adapt to the authority of 
the sciences which hold the societal monopoly of secular knowledge. It 
must, last, agree to the premises of a constitutional state grounded in a 
profane morality.62 
 
These criteria are designed to ensure that citizens accept the presence of 
multiple of viewpoints and common rules for self-governance in modern societies that 
DUHGHILQHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRI³GHHSUHOLJLRXVDQGLGHRORJLFDOGLYLGHV´63 The 
demands of such an understanding of the sacred are quite effective on their own. The 
requirements Habermas places on modern religious consciousness already defend 
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citizen-atheists from nonpluralistic, dogmatic and authoritarian religious worldviews 
without the need for the additional protection of secular translation. 
Although their use of religious reason as a justification in the formal public 
sphere overstepped the boundaries of the institutional translation proviso, Schuman 
and Adenauer did not violate any of +DEHUPDV¶VWKUHHSUHFRQGLWLRQVIRUPRGHUQ
religious consciousness. Neither sought to convert non-believers, made any dogmatic 
epistemic claims or undermined the democratic political process in arguing for 
integration in explicitly religious terms. On the contrary, they deployed faith in order 
to spur their citizens into more inclusive understandings of solidarity that went 
beyond the borders of the nation. 
Although their rhetoric alarmed secularists, Schuman and Adenauer disputed 
exclusionary, nonpluralistic interpretations of their appeals to faith. When asked about 
the possibility of Turkey joining the European Communities in 1953, Adenauer was 
unperturbed by the prospect of allowing a country with a majority Muslim population 
LQWRWKH(&6&2QWKHFRQWUDU\KHH[FODLPHG³7XUNey? It would make me very 
happy´8QIRUWXQDWHO\VLQFHWKHQ(XURSHDQOHDGHUVKDYHreligious language in 
exclusive, nonpluralistic ways to bar Turkey from the EU since it is not part of 
³&KULVWLDQ(XURSH´+RZHYHUWKLVLVQRWDQDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW6FKXPDQDQG
Adenauer, but for the illegitimacy of these more recent, nonpluralistic uses of 
religion.64 
In addition to overt theological domination, allowing faith-based arguments into 
the formal public sphere raises red flags for Habermas given his commitment to the 
idea that democratic communities must act on the basis of mutually acceptable, 
shared reasons.65 +DEHUPDV¶VOLPLWVRQVHFXODUWUDQVODWLRQVHHNWRHQVXUHWKDWWKH
institutions of will-formation, where laws are debated and adopted, are governed 
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using reasons that all citizens could understand and adopt as their own. He argues that 
faith-based justifications violate this requirement, as citizen-atheists cannot be 
expected to understand the arguments provided by citizen-believers since they do not 
share the same principles of epistemic validation. 
I am sympathetic to this issue. Habermas is right in pointing out that theological 
FODLPVUHVWRQGLIIHUHQWDVVXPSWLRQVWKDQWKRVHWKDWKDYHEHHQSXW³WRWKHWHVWRI
PLJUDWLQJLQWRWKHUHDOPRIWKHVHFXODUWKHSURIDQH´$GRUQR+RZHYHULWLVQRW
clear that religious arguments are necessarily untranslatable or incomprehensible to 
non-believers.66 $VWKHXVHRIWKHSKUDVH³IRUWKHVDNHRIDUJXPHQW´LPSOLHV
individuals are able to suspend their beliefs in order to argue for positions using 
assumptions that do match their actual beliefs. It is even possible to engage in 
religious arguments without believing in God, as the presence of atheist theologians 
demonstrates. %HQKDELEFRQFOXGHV³5DGLFDOLQFRPPHQVXUDELOLW\DQGUDGLFDO
XQWUDQVODWDELOLW\DUHLQFRKHUHQWQRWLRQV«,IUDGLFDOXQWUDQVODWDELOLW\ZHUHWUXHZH
could not even recognize the other set of utterances as part of a language, that is, a 
practice that is more or less rule-JRYHUQHGDQGVKDUHGLQIDLUO\SUHGLFWDEOHZD\V´67 
Religious arguments are not always incommensurable, nor are they necessary 
dogmatic. As Maeve Cooke points out, Habermas seems WR³FRQIODW[e] religious 
arguments with authoritarian DUJXPHQWV´)DLWKFDQFHUWDLQO\EHLQWHUSUHWHGLQ
authoritarian or dogmatic ways, as is the case in fundamentalist movements that rely 
on literal readings of holy texts and the unquestionable authority of religious leaders. 
HoweverVXFKDQ³DXWKRULWDULDQDWWLWXGHWRZDUGNQRZOHGJHLVQRWDnecessary 
LQJUHGLHQWRIUHOLJLRXVIDLWK´68 
Given the hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church under an infallible 
pope, it is understandable that secular citizens and non-Catholics would be wary of 
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WKHSRQWLII¶VLQIOXHQFH. However, while Roman Catholics recognize the absolute 
authority of the pope in matters of faith and dogma, the political influence of the 
Bishop of Rome is fairly limited. Unlike Islamic muftis, who can issue fatwas (legal 
ruling) that are considered directly binding on Muslims who have pledged themselves 
to that scholar, the pope has no formal power over Catholics in political affairs, which 
are a matter fRUWKHEHOLHYHU¶VLQGLYLGXDOFRQVFLHQFH69 
Although 6FKXPDQDQG$GHQDXHUZHUHLQVSLUHGDQGPRWLYDWHGE\3LXV;,,¶V
support for integration, they did not dogmatically follow his orders in bringing the 
ECSC into existence. On the contrary, they drew on the 3RSH¶VZRUGV± and on their 
faith ± to expand their cognitive, motivational and justificatory capacities to see 
integration beyond the nation-state as both possible and desirable. The ability to draw 
RQWKHSRSH¶VDUJXPHQWVIRULQVSLUDWLRQLVQRWOLPLWHGWo Catholics or religious 
believers. Despite his background as a Jew and a communist, the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman has used 3RSH)UDQFLV¶VUHOLJLRXVO\LQVSLUHGDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWWKH³EXLOGLQJ
RIQHZZDOOVLQ(XURSH´WRDUJXHIRUJUHDWHURSHQQHVVDQGVROLGarity with refugees 
fleeing civil wars in Africa and the Middle East.70 
These examples demonstrate that reducing all religion to authoritarian 
dogmatism is both sociologically reductionist and essentialist. As Habermas himself 
admits when considering the ciYLOULJKWVPRYHPHQWLQ$PHULFD³FKXUFKHVDQG
religious communities generally perform important functions for stabilizing and 
DGYDQFLQJDOLEHUDOSROLWLFDOFXOWXUH´71 In such cases, even non-believers seem to be 
able to reasonably assent to religious arguments, even if they do not share their 
epistemic preconditions. 
It is important to remember that political arguments made within the formal 
public sphere have a different status than those made within a philosophical context. 
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In a democracy ± even one that IDOOVVKRUWRI+DEHUPDV¶VGHOLEHUDWLYHLGHDO± no 
decision is made once and for all. On the contraryODZVDUH³WKHfallible result of an 
attempt to determine what is right through a discussion that has been brought to a 
provisional close under the pressurHWRGHFLGH´72 Just because the officials acting 
within political institutions are forced to make decisions, this does not mean that their 
conclusions cannot be revisited in the future. The minority ± even when it disagrees 
with the justifications provided ± can consent because it is protected both by 
democratic procedures and by the conditional nature of all decisions. 
In addition to fears about theocratic oppression and the lack of common 
epistemic foundations, Habermas is also concerned that religious arguments in the 
formal public sphere will undermine the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis concrete 
ethical doctrines. However, it is unclear why he differentiates religious ideals from 
comprehensive understandings of the good life that rely on commitments that are not 
XQLYHUVDOO\VKDUHG,QKLVFULWLTXHRI+DEHUPDV&KDUOHV7D\ORUQRWHV³7KHUHLVQR
UHDVRQWRVLQJOHRXWUHOLJLRQDVDJDLQVWQRQUHOLJLRXVµVHFXODU¶LQDQRWKHUZLGHO\XVHG
VHQVHRUDWKHLVWYLHZSRLQWV´7D\ORUFRPSDUHVSKLORVRSKLFDOHWKLFDOdoctrines to 
religious ones: 
A Kantian will justify the rights to life and freedom by pointing to the 
dignity of rational agency; a utilitarian will speak of the necessity to treat 
beings who can experience joy and suffering in such a way as to 
maximize the first and minimize the second. A Christian will speak of 
humans as made in the image of God. They concur on the principles, but 
differ on the deeper reasons for holding to this ethic. The state must 
uphold the ethic, but must refrain from favoring any of the deeper 
reasons.73 
 
Taylor calls for a more pragmatic, less demanding approach to political 
agreement in an age of radical pluralism.74 Instead of eliminating references to 
UHOLJLRQRXWULJKWVXFKDQDSSURDFKZRXOGDOORZ³RWKHUZRUOGO\´DSSHDOVLQWRWKH
pXEOLFVSKHUH³SURYLGHGWKHUHDVRQLQJLQTXHVWLRQVDWLVILHVWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDODQG
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HWKLFDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRI«QRQ-DXWKRULWDULDQWKLQNLQJ´&RRNHDUJXHVWKDW7D\ORU¶V 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLV³WKHDSSURSULDWHFRXQWHUSDUWWRZKDW+DEHUPDVUHIHUVWRDVD
µSRVWVHFXODUVRFLHW\¶´75 
,IZHWDNH+DEHUPDV¶V³SRVWVHFXODUL]DWLRQWKHVLV´to require a reexamination of 
the limits of both reason and religion, it seems natural to consider whether reason 
should be allowed to claim sole jurisdiction in the formal public sphere. The desire to 
purge politics from all traces of the sacred dates back to the Enlightenment, which 
assumed that the decline of religion was a necessary epiphenomenon of 
modernization.76 The rejection of the secularization thesis has already broken the 
connection between the empirical observations of the decline of religion and its 
normative desirability. Habermas pushes these implications even further, arguing that 
³ZHVKRXOGXQGHUVWDQGFXOWXUDODQGVRFLHWDOVHFXODUL]DWLRQDVDGRuble learning 
process that compels both the traditions of the Enlightenment and the religious 
GRFWULQHVWRUHIOHFWRQWKHLURZQUHVSHFWLYHOLPLWV´77 
Although he is prepared to reexamine its role in the informal context of civil 
VRFLHW\+DEHUPDVDUJXHV³7he secularization of the state is not the same as the 
VHFXODUL]DWLRQRIVRFLHW\´+RZHYHUJLYHQWKHGHPLVHRIWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW¶V
predictions about secularization ± and his own recognition of the inherent value 
attributed to the worth and value of substantive conceptions of the good that are not 
universally shared ± he must also reconsider the role of religion in formal 
institutions.78 This argument is strengthened by the fact that the preconditions he 
SODFHVRQ³PRGHUQUHOLJLRXVFRQVFLRXVQHVV´DOUHDG\SURWects non-believers from 
theocratic oppression before institutional translation even begins. 
In presenting his argument for the need to loosen the restrictions on religious 
UHDVRQLQ³ZHDN´SXEOLFV+DEHUPDVDUJXHVWKDWWKHGLVHQFKDQWPHQWZLWKVHFXODU
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models of modernization evident in the fundamentalist attacks on the West since 9/11 
cannot be countered without drawing on the resources of faith. However, combining 
this with the ambivalence and meaninglessness experienced by many within the West, 
it seems riJKWWRDVNZKHWKHUVHFXODULVWDUJXPHQWV³DUHVWLOOSRZHUIXOHQRXJKWRGD\WR
justify the ways in which it undermines the political autonomy of citizens who do not 
VXEVFULEHWRSRVWPHWDSK\VLFDOWKLQNLQJ´79 Based on my philosophical reflections and 
the example of European integration, I argue that they are not. 
$GMXVWLQJ+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRU\WRDFFRXQWIRUWKHREMHFWLRQV,KDYHUDLVHGLV
relatively simple. It requires changing the ³LQVWLWXWLRQDOWUDQVODWLRQSURYLVR´LQWRD
discursively determined translation proviso. This revised principle would require 
citizens and their representatives in state institutions to collectively determine what 
forms of religious argument are nonathoritarian, nondogmatic and pluralistic through 
public debate, instead of excluding all religious reasons from the formal public sphere 
via philosophical fiat.  
Such an approach has a number of advantages. To start, it allows for geographic 
flexibility in terms of what forms of religious argumentation different communities 
admit into the formal public sphere. It also enables citizens within a single community 
to become more or less open to religious arguments over time. Most importantly, it 
PDNHV+DEHUPDV¶VYLHZVRQUHOLJLRQPRUHIDLWKIXOWRKLVSURFHGXUDOFRPPLWPHQWWR
democracy as an open form of politics based on communicative action. 
Whereas determining acceptable political arguments ahead of time and from the 
outside is not a problem for monological theorists like Rawls, for a discourse theorist 
like Habermas the rules of a communicatively open deliberative democracy ought to 
be discursively determined by the participants themselves. While Habermas may still 
DUJXHWKDW³UXOHVRISURFHGXUHPXVWHPSRZHUWKHKRXVHOHDGHU>LQSDUOLDPHQW@WRVWULNH
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religious positions or justifications from the oIILFLDOWUDQVFULSW´KLVEURDGHU
philosophical commitments require him to concede that these rules and their 
application be based on what citizens debating in the informal public sphere deem to 
be institutionally admissible claims, not on transcendental, prepolitical boundaries.80 
Thinking pragmatically about these issues involves acknowledging that it is 
impossible to prevent individuals and office-holders, who believe in the sacred from 
reasoning based on these presuppositions in practice. Indeed, in many cases religious 
and secular reasons are so intertwined that it may be impossible to unwind them.81 In 
the end, it is up to citizens in the informal public sphere to exercise their judgment 
and discursively decide whether to accept these arguments as institutionally 
admissible. 
While non-pluralistic, dogmatic and authoritarian religious claims ought to be 
excluded from the political public sphere, this revised, discursive proviso leaves room 
IRU³UHDVRQDEOH´IDLWK-based conceptions of the good life to enter into the formal 
public sphere as part of a broader public discourse over the role religion can and 
RXJKWWRSOD\LQSXEOLFOLIH)RU+DEHUPDVRQO\HWKLFDOGRFWULQHVWKDWUHMHFW³YLROHQFH
in spreading their beliefs and imposing them on their own members, let alone 
PDQLSXODWLRQLQGXFLQJVXLFLGHDWWDFNVGHVHUYHWKHSUHGLFDWHRIµUHDVRQDEOH¶´82 On 
these criteria, justifications based on reasonable religious views pose little danger to 
the autonomy of non-religious citizens. While my argument would require the flexible 
boundaries between the formal and the informal public spheres to be 
FRPPXQLFDWLYHO\GHWHUPLQHGWKLVSRVLWLRQLVPRUHIDLWKIXOWR+DEHUPDV¶VGLVFXUVLYH
understanding to politics.83 
 
 26 
Integrating Religion and Reason 
,QOLJKWRI+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRORJLFDOWXUQDQGKLVemotional pleas (Plädoyer) on 
behalf of the EU, it is hardly surprising that Peter Gordon is able to GLVFHUQ³FHUWDLQ
DIILQLWLHVZLWKWKHSRVWZDUGLVFRXUVHRI&KULVWLDQ'HPRFUDF\´LQKLVUHFHQWZRUN 
Drawing on the role religious justifications played in the early history of European 
LQWHJUDWLRQ,DUJXHWKDWHYHQ+DEHUPDV¶V³chastened secularism´VHWVWKHOLPLWVRI
religious reason too narrowly.84 The EU, whose founders drew on explicitly religious 
justifications as representatives of their respective states, is thus a powerful counter-
H[DPSOHWR+DEHUPDV¶Vtheory of the role of religion in public life. I conclude that 
pluralistic, nondogmatic and nonauthoritarian religious claims should be allowed to 
enter into the formal public sphere through a procedural interpretation of secular 
translation. 
Despite this criticism,VKDUH+DEHUPDV¶VEDVLFIUDPHZRUNIRUDSOXUDOLVWLF
deliberative democracy. This is hardly uncontroversial. In his reflections on 
+DEHUPDV¶V³WKHRORJLFDOWXUQ´Harrington objects forcefully to this approach. 
Drawing on a metaphor from international relations, he interprets Habermas¶V
religious writings WREHSUHVHQWLQJDVWDWLF³SLFWXUHRIWZRRUPRUHFRXQWULHVFRPLQJ
to represent themselves to one another, as if through ambassadors, in a single section 
RIWLPH´+HDUJXHVWKDW³JRRGGLSORPDF\EHWZHHQSHRSOHGR>HV@QRWVHHPDQHQWLUHO\
appropriate model for our understanding of the conflict between knowledge and 
IDLWK´+DUULQJWRQIHDUVWKLVSURFHVVZLOOXOWLPDWHO\GHJHQHUDWHLQWR³DGLSORPDWLF
stand-off, dominated by procedural questions of the conditions of cohabitation and 
WROHUDWLRQZKLFKDOOUHDOO\VXEVWDQWLYHPRPHQWRIGLVSXWHLVGHIHUUHG´85 
I agree that religion and secular reason are incommensurable in the sense that 
they will never succeed in fully bridging their differences.86 However, unlike 
Harrington, I see this as an advantage. If faith ever merged with secular knowledge, 
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then it could no longer serve as the canary in the coalmine of modernity, i.e. as a 
resource for critical diagnoses of the present. 
In this context iWLVLPSRUWDQWWRUHPHPEHUWKDW+DEHUPDV¶VFRPPXQLFDWLYH
approach to politics builds on Hans-*HRUJ*DGDPHU¶VQRWLRQRID³IXVLRQRI
KRUL]RQV´Horizontverschmelzung). Under this model the goal of interaction is not 
assimilation, but a convergence of perspectives where each side learns to see the 
world from the perspective of the other without giving up its unique identity.87 The 
fact that reason and religion have not unified does not mean that the diplomatic 
process has failed or must remain synchronically stuck in time and space. On the 
contrary, it holds out hope for gradual mutual understanding without total integration. 
The implications of this interpretation of the relationship between faith and 
NQRZOHGJHFDQEHLOOXVWUDWHGE\DSSO\LQJ+DUULQJWRQ¶VLPDJHRIGLSORPDF\WRWKH(8
Ever since the formation of the modern state system in the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), the emerging nation-states of Europe communicated via ambassadors. These 
negotiations often failed to even achieve even the barest modus vivendi, as is 
demonstrated by (XURSH¶VORQJKLVWRU\RIZDUIDUH+RZHYHUin part by drawing on 
the religious resources of transnational solidarity in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, representatives of these states have finally succeeded in reaching an 
understanding that has brought peace to Europe, turning it into what Alessandro 
Ferrara refers to as ³DVSHFLDODUHDRIKXPDQKRSH´88 
Although the EU does not supersede or eliminate existing states, it does bring 
them together in shared political institutions that go far beyond the bilateral 
GLSORPDF\RIDPEDVVDGRUV+DEHUPDV¶VKRSHLVWKDWthe schema of political 
Horizontverschmelzung might serve as a model for other regions and for the world as 
DZKROHZKLFKFRXOGPDNHWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOGLSORPDF\WRD³JOREDO
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GRPHVWLFSROLF\´Weltinnenpolitik) that extends solidarity to encompass the entire 
globe.89 If this vision is to be realized, world leaders will most likely have to violate 
the boundaries Habermas sets for religious reason by drawing explicitly on faith-
based perspectives to provide the normative resources of transnational solidarity 
necessary to conceive, motivate and justify the creation of a flexible global order 
without world government. 
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